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  Abstract 
This paper examines demand-enhancing investment and pricing in mixed duopoly. We 
analyze a model with differentiated products and reduced-form demand, making no 
assumptions on the relative efficiency of the public firm. First, we derive sufficient conditions 
for public investment to crowd out private investment. Second, we characterize the 
conditions under which individual investments (prices, respectively) in the mixed duopoly are 
higher (lower) than in the standard duopoly. Third, we show that with linear demand the 
public firm effectively disciplines the private firm, inducing an improvement in its price-quality 
ratio relative to the standard duopoly. 
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JEL Classification 
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 1 Introduction
In many markets, state-owned public ﬁrms compete with private ﬁrms. Well-
known examples include public utilities (e.g., telecommunications, electric
power, water, and gas), armaments, automobiles, banking, insurance, edu-
cation, and medical care. The mixed-oligopoly literature has analyzed the
functioning of such markets extensively, assuming that public ﬁrms maximize
welfare rather than proﬁts.1 The public debate on the role of state-owned
ﬁrms, however, conveys a less favorable view of public ﬁrms. In particular,
there is a concern that public ﬁrms might crowd out (potentially more eﬃ-
cient) private ﬁrms because of their non-proﬁt-oriented investment and pric-
ing decisions. This concern is particularly relevant in industries where ﬁrms
must make large demand-enhancing investments (e.g., in building network
infrastructure, enhancing product design, ramping up advertising campaigns,
etc.) before competing in the product market.2 The empirical evidence on
the impact of public investment on private investment is arguably mixed.
David et al. (2000) conclude from a survey of the empirical evidence accu-
mulated over the past 35 years that it is ambivalent whether public R&D is
a complement or substitute for private R&D. It is thus surprising that the
mixed-oligopoly literature has largely ignored demand-enhancing investment.
In this paper, we introduce demand-enhancing investment by a public
and a private ﬁrm into a mixed-oligopoly model. Speciﬁcally, we analyze a
duopoly model with diﬀerentiated products and reduced-form demand func-
tions, making no assumptions on the relative eﬃciency of the private and
the public ﬁrm. We consider three diﬀerent market conﬁgurations. In the
welfare benchmark, the social planner chooses the prices and investments of
1Important contributions to this literature include De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Cre-
mer et al. (1991), Anderson et al. (1997), Matsumura (1998), Matsumura and Matsushima
(2004), and Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006). We will provide a more detailed discussion
of the related literature below.
2See, e.g., the articles “Roads to nowhere” (December 11, 2009) and “Paved with good
intentions” (January 29, 2009) in The Economist.
2both ﬁrms so as to maximize social welfare. In the standard duopoly, both
ﬁrms maximize proﬁts (i.e., the public ﬁrm “mimics” the private ﬁrm) and
play a two-stage game where they simultaneously choose investments in stage
1 and prices in stage 2. In the mixed duopoly, ﬁrms play a two-stage game
and simultaneously choose investments in stage 1 and prices in stage 2, but
the public ﬁrm maximizes social welfare rather than proﬁts.
We characterize equilibrium investments and pricing in each market con-
ﬁguration and derive the following main results: First, for public investment
to crowd out private investment, it is suﬃcient that public investment reduces
(i) the equilibrium price of the private ﬁrm, and (ii) the demand-enhancing
eﬀect of private investment. These eﬀects both reduce the private ﬁrm’s
marginal returns to investment and therefore dampen its investment incen-
tive.3 Second, we demonstrate that the eﬀect of welfare (rather than proﬁt)
maximization by the public ﬁrm on equilibrium investments and prices is
generally ambiguous. In the linear demand model, for instance, the changes
in investments and prices crucially depend on the substitutability among
products. Third, to further study the role of the public ﬁrm for market
performance, we examine the price-quality ratios oﬀered by the public and
the private ﬁrm in the linear demand model. We ﬁnd that the public ﬁrm
eﬀectively disciplines the private ﬁrm in the mixed duopoly. In particular,
we show that the price-quality ratios oﬀered in the mixed duopoly are more
favorable than those in the standard duopoly. In fact, the public ﬁrm’s
price-quality ratio in the mixed duopoly is even better than in the welfare
benchmark (except for very high substitutability) to correct for the private
ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization.
This paper contributes to the mixed-oligopoly literature initiated by Mer-
rill and Schneider (1966). One strand of this literature focuses on imperfect
price competition with diﬀerentiated products. Cremer et al. (1991) ana-
3In the linear demand model, crowding out may occur only if public investment has a
direct negative eﬀect on the demand for the private ﬁrm’s product.
3lyze a Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs and show that
a mixed oligopoly with one public ﬁrm is socially preferable to a standard
oligopoly only for two or more than six ﬁrms. Employing a CES model with
endogenous entry, Anderson et al. (1997) study the eﬀect of privatizing the
public ﬁrm. These authors show that privatization increases welfare if the
public ﬁrm makes a loss and suggest that proﬁtable public ﬁrms should not
necessarily be privatized. None of these papers analyzes demand-enhancing
investments or considers reduced-form demand functions.
Another strand of the literature focuses on R&D investments by private
and public ﬁrms. Delbono and Denicol` o (1993) consider a mixed duopoly
with an R&D race. Their key result is that the public ﬁrm can mitigate
the standard overinvestment problem in R&D races, leading to higher so-
cial welfare. Poyago-Theotoky (1998) considers a setting where innovation
is easily imitated such that free riding leads to an underinvestment problem.
She shows that the public ﬁrm can alleviate the underinvestment problem
but ﬁnds ambiguous welfare eﬀects. Matsumura and Matsushima (2004)
employ a Hotelling model where production costs are endogenous and ﬁrms
can engage in cost-reducing activities. These authors show that the private
ﬁrm has lower costs because it undertakes excessive cost-reducing activi-
ties. Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006) investigate a setting where a public
research institute competes against proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrms. They
use a patent race model where each ﬁrm chooses both its innovation size
and R&D expenditure. These authors show that the innovation size (R&D
expenditure) chosen by the public institute is too small (too large) from a
social welfare perspective. It is important to note that none of these papers
analyzes demand-enhancing investments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the analytical framework. In Section 3, we characterize equilibrium
pricing and investment in the various market conﬁgurations. In Section 4, we
derive our key results for the reduced-form model. In Section 5 we provide
4an extensive analysis of the linear demand model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
We consider a duopoly model with a public ﬁrm 1 and a private ﬁrm 2 which
produce horizontally diﬀerentiated products indexed by i = 1,2. Each ﬁrm
faces a reduced-form demand Di(p,θ), where p = (pi,pj),i 6= j, is the vector
of prices and θ = (θi,θj),i 6= j, reﬂects the respective product qualities.4
Firms face constant marginal cost ci and can make demand-enhancing in-
vestments into quality at cost Fi(θi).
Throughout the analysis, we suppose that the following assumptions hold:
[A1] Products are demand substitutes and prices are strategic complements,
i.e., ∂Di/∂pi < 0, ∂Di/∂pj ≥ 0, ∂D2
i/∂p2
i ≤ 0, and ∂2Di/(∂pi∂pj) ≥ 0,
i,j = 1,2, i 6= j.
[A2] Higher quality strictly increases own demand and weakly decreases
demand for the other product, i.e., ∂Di/∂θi > 0 and ∂Dj/∂θi ≤ 0,
i,j = 1,2, i 6= j.
[A3] Firms face constant marginal costs ci ≥ 0 and investment costs Fi(θi),
with ∂Fi/∂θi > 0 and ∂F 2
i /∂θ2
i > 0.
For later reference, we note that reduced-form ﬁrm proﬁts are given by
πi(pi,pj,θi,θj) = (pi − ci)Di(pi,pj,θi,θj) − Fi(θi), i,j = 1,2. (1)
3 Alternative Market Conﬁgurations
We consider three market conﬁgurations that diﬀer in terms of the ﬁrms’ ob-
jective functions and the sequence of events. The benchmark conﬁguration is
4If product i’s quality encompasses multiple dimensions, θi should be interpreted as a
real-valued index summarizing the various aspects of quality (cf. Buehler et al. (2006)).
5the welfare optimum, where the social planner chooses prices and investments
in markets 1 and 2 so as to maximize welfare. In the standard duopoly, ﬁrms
1 and 2 play a two-stage game, where investments are simultaneously chosen
in stage 1 and prices are determined in stage 2. Both ﬁrms are assumed to
maximize proﬁts, that is, the public ﬁrm behaves as if it were a private ﬁrm.
In the mixed conﬁguration, ﬁrms also play a two-stage game, but the public










+ π1(p1,p2,θ1,θ2) + π2(p2,p1,θ2,θ1)
denote the welfare function, where the ﬁrst two terms represent consumer
surplus in markets 1 and 2, respectively, and the third and fourth term
represent ﬁrm proﬁts.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for welfare-maximizing prices pW = (pW
1 ,pW
2 )
and quality levels θ = (θW
1 ,θW
































































6and the revenue in market i is given by Ri ≡ piDi. The superscript W
indicates welfare-maximizing quantities.
Inspection of condition (2) indicates that marginal-cost pricing (pW
i = ci)
maximizes social welfare if markets i and j are independent (∂DW
j /∂pi =
εW
ij = 0). If markets i and j are interdependent (∂DW
j /∂pi > 0,εW
ij < 0),
however, optimal pricing in market i must account for its eﬀects on market
j, leading to deviations from marginal-cost pricing. Speciﬁcally, a marginal
increase in pi increases the demand for product j, aﬀecting both consumer
surplus (the ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of (2)) and ﬁrm proﬁt in market j (the
second term). Since both the ﬁrst and the second term are positive, welfare-
optimal prices are strictly higher than marginal costs in the respective mar-
kets (pW





























summarize the mark-up of pi over ci because of the positive impact of pi on
consumer and producer surplus in market j (conditional on εii), respectively.
According to condition (3), welfare-maximizing investment requires that
the social beneﬁts of investment equal social costs. If the investment in
market i does not directly aﬀect demand in market j (i.e., ∂DW
j /∂θi = 0),
the social beneﬁts relate to the demand-enhancing eﬀects in market i only
(the ﬁrst two terms on the l.h.s. of (3)). If the investment in market i
also reduces the demand for product j (i.e., ∂DW
j /∂θi < 0), the welfare-
maximizing investment is smaller because of the adverse eﬀect on the other
5Note that the second term on the r.h.s. of (2) is similar to the upward correction
that a proﬁt-maximizing multi-product monopolist applies to its Lerner index in market
i relative to a single-product monopolist (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988, p. 70).
7product.
3.2 Standard Duopoly
In this conﬁguration, both the private and the public ﬁrm maximize proﬁts
(i.e., the public ﬁrm ‘mimics’ the private ﬁrm). Firms simultaneously make
demand-enhancing investments in stage 1 and compete in the product market










, i = 1,2, (5)
where the superscript S denotes the standard duopoly market conﬁguration.
Given the vector of investment levels θ = (θ1,θ2) from stage 1, equilibrium
prices in stage 2 are functions of these investments and characterized by
the best-response functions pS
i (θ,pS
j ) = pS
i ,i 6= j. With equilibrium prices
denoted as pS(θ) = (pS
1(θ),pS














For the characterization of the ﬁrst-order condition, it is useful to introduce
the following notation.
Notation 1 (demand eﬀect) The total diﬀerential of demand in market i




















with k indicating the relevant market conﬁguration.
Using Notation 1 and applying the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order condition
8can be written as
(p
S








In the mixed duopoly, the private ﬁrm 1 maximizes proﬁts, whereas the public
ﬁrm 2 chooses its price and investment so as to maximize social welfare. The
key diﬀerence to the welfare benchmark in Subsection 3.1 is that the social
planner cannot determine ﬁrm 1’s pricing and investment.
We ﬁrst consider pricing in stage 2. Note that ﬁrm 1’s pricing rule is
similar to (5) in the standard duopoly, whereas ﬁrm 2’s pricing rule is similar



























where the superscript M indicates the mixed duopoly conﬁguration.
Next, consider investment in stage 1. The ﬁrst-order condition of the
private ﬁrm is again similar to the standard duopoly,
(p
M







Using Notation 1 and applying the envelope theorem for the public ﬁrm, the
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The key diﬀerence to (3) in the welfare benchmark is that a change in the pub-
9lic ﬁrm’s investment θ2 now also generates price-mediated demand eﬀects via
p1, whereas there are only direct demand eﬀects in the welfare benchmark.
4 Results
In this section, we present our key results for the model with reduced-form
demand. First, we derive suﬃcient conditions for public investment to crowd
out private investment. Second, we examine how the public ﬁrm’s welfare
(rather than proﬁt) maximizing behavior aﬀects equilibrium prices and in-
vestments in quality, respectively.
Our ﬁrst result gives suﬃcient conditions for public investment to crowd
out private investment.
Proposition 1 (crowding out) Consider market conﬁguration k = S,M.
For the crowding out of private investment (dθk
1/dθ2 < 0), it is suﬃcient that
public investment
(i) decreases the equilibrium price of the private ﬁrm (∂pk
1/∂θ2 < 0), and
(ii) (weakly) decreases the demand-enhancing eﬀect of private investment
(∂ b Dk
1,1/∂θ2 ≤ 0).
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, public investment crowds out







1 < 0. Since the
















< 0, k = S,M.
Now, observe that (pk
1 − c1) > 0 from (5) or (7), respectively, and b Dk
1,1 > 0
from ∂F k
i /∂θi > 0 by [A3] and (6) or (9). Conditions (i) and (ii) thus jointly
guarantee that ∂2πk
1/(∂θ1∂θ2) < 0.
10Conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 jointly guarantee that the marginal
returns to private investment are decreasing in public investment, such that
investments are strategic substitutes from the private ﬁrm’s point of view
(∂2πk
1/(∂θ1∂θ2) < 0).6
Proposition 1 highlights that public investment is likely to crowd out pri-
vate investment if it (i) reduces the equilibrium price that the private ﬁrm
can charge for its diﬀerentiated product, and (ii) undermines the eﬀective-
ness of private investment in generating demand for its own product. These
eﬀects both reduce the private ﬁrm’s marginal returns to investment and
therefore dampen its investment incentive. Intuitively, conditions (i) and (ii)
are likely to be satisﬁed if products are close substitutes and investments
lead to business stealing.
Next, consider how the public ﬁrm’s welfare (rather than proﬁt) maxi-
mizing behavior aﬀects equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2 (pricing) Changing the market conﬁguration from S to M
(i) reduces the private ﬁrm’s price if εM
11/εS
11 > 1;
(ii) reduces the public ﬁrm’s price if εM
22/εS
22 > Y M
21 + XM
21 > 0.
Proof. (i) Rewriting pS
1 > pM
















































6Note that Proposition 1 does not place any restrictions on the public ﬁrm’s proﬁt
function.
11The result follows immediately.
Condition (i) highlights that the welfare maximization of the public ﬁrm
reduces the private ﬁrm’s price (relative to the standard duopoly) if the price
elasticity—evaluated at the relevant equilibrium quantities—is higher. For
a reduction of the public ﬁrm’s price, the increase in the price elasticity
must dominate any price-increasing externalities to market 1. Proposition 2
thus suggests that the impact of the public ﬁrm’s welfare maximization on
equilibrium prices is not clear-cut and crucially depends on the properties of
the demand functions.7
Finally, consider how the public ﬁrm’s welfare (rather than proﬁt) maxi-
mizing behavior aﬀects equilibrium investment.
Proposition 3 (investment) Changing the market conﬁguration from S to
M
(i) increases private investment if
(p
M




1 − c1)b D
S
1,1; (11)
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1,2d˜ p1 > 0. (12)
Proof. (i) The investment incentive of ﬁrm 1 is given by (pk
1 − c1)b Dk
1,1,k =
S,M. Condition (11) guarantees that the investment incentive increases with
a change from S to M.
(ii) From (10), ﬁrm 2’s ﬁrst-order condition in market conﬁguration M is
7In Section 5 below, we will show that the price eﬀects of changing the market conﬁg-
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1,2d˜ p1 = 0.
The investment incentive is higher than under market conﬁguration S if,
evaluated at S quantities,
(p
S












2,2d˜ p2 + (p
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2 /∂θ2 = ∂πS
2/∂θ2 = 0 from (6). This completes the
proof.
Condition (i) of Proposition 3 states that private investment in the mixed
duopoly is strictly higher than in the standard duopoly if the marginal invest-
ment incentive—evaluated at M rather than S quantities—is strictly higher.
Condition (ii) follows from the argument that public investment in M must
be strictly higher than in S if the marginal investment incentive—evaluated
at S quantities (such that ∂πS
2/∂θ2 = 0)—is strictly positive.
Beyond Propositions 1–3, little can be said about equilibrium pricing
and investment in the reduced-form demand model. In the next section, we
therefore analyze the linear demand model where we can derive closed-form
solutions for these variables.
5 The Linear Demand Model
Let us now consider the linear model and suppose, for simplicity, that the
demand for product i does not directly depend on ﬁrm j’s demand-enhancing
investment (i.e., ∂Di/∂θj = 0).8 Speciﬁcally, we assume that demand is given
by
Di(pi,pj,θi) = α − βpi + γpj + θi, α,β,γ > 0 (13)
8We will discuss below how allowing for such a direct eﬀect aﬀects the results.
13where α,β and γ are exogenous parameters and β > γ, that is, demand is
more responsive to a change in own price than to a change in the competi-
tor’s price. For simplicity, we assume that marginal costs are constant and
normalized to zero (c1 = c2 = 0), whereas investment costs are given by
Fi(θi) = θ2
i. Note that this model satisﬁes assumptions [A1]–[A3].
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium prices pk
i and qualities θk
i , as well as
the corresponding price-quality ratios rk
i ≡ pk
i/θk
i ,k = W,S,M, as functions
of the model parameters.
<Table 1 around here>
We now derive a number of results for the linear demand model that
illustrate Propositions 1-3 above.
Result 1 (crowding in) Suppose demand is linear and given by (13). Then,
(i) in the standard duopoly, public investment enhances private investment
(∂2πS
1/(∂θ1∂θ2) > 0).
(ii) in the mixed duopoly, public investment does not aﬀect private invest-
ment (∂2πM
1 /(∂θ1∂θ2) = 0).
Proof. (i) Using (13), straightforward calculations yield ∂pS
1/∂θ2 = γ/(4β2−
γ2) > 0 and ∂ b DS
1,1/∂θ2 = 0, implying ∂2πS
1/(∂θ1∂θ2) > 0. (ii) Similarly,
∂pM
1 /∂θ2 = 0 and ∂ b DM
1,1/∂θ2 = 0 yield ∂2πM
1 /(∂θ1∂θ2) = 0 (see Proposition
1).
To understand the intuition for Result 1, ﬁrst note that public investment
cannot aﬀect the demand-enhancing eﬀect of private investment in the linear
demand model (∂ b Dk
1,1/∂θ2 = 0,k = S,M). Therefore, the only eﬀect that
public investment may have on private investment is price-mediated: Because
of strategic complementary in prices by Assumption [A1], public investment
(weakly) increases the prices of both the public ﬁrm (∂pM
2 /∂θ2 > 0) and
14the private ﬁrm (∂pM
1 /∂θ2 ≥ 0). Part (i) of Result 1 shows that the strate-
gic complementarity in prices carries over to investments in the standard
duopoly (∂pS
2/∂θ2 > 0). Part (ii) of Result 1, in turn, highlights that public
investment does not aﬀect private investment in the mixed duopoly. This
follows from the fact that, for a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm, the direct
extra revenues from a marginal price increase, DM
2 , cancel against the direct
extra expenses by consumers, DM
2 , such that its ﬁrst-order condition for op-
timal pricing does not depend on θ2 in the linear demand model. As a result,
the price of the private ﬁrm does not react to changes in public investment
(∂pM
1 /∂θ2 = 0), leaving the private ﬁrm’s investment incentive unaﬀected.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that Result 1 crucially relies on the
assumption that demand-enhancing investment in market j does not directly
aﬀect the demand for product i (i.e., ∂Di/∂θj = 0). Depending on parameter
values, a negative cross-eﬀect (∂Di/∂θj < 0) might dominate the (weakly)
positive price-mediated eﬀect of public investment, leading to crowding out
both in the standard and the mixed duopoly.
Let us now consider the price changes associated with changes in market
conﬁguration. For the linear demand model, we can directly compare prices
across all three market conﬁgurations, accounting for the associated changes
in investments.9 Figure 1 plots the closed-form solutions for the equilibrium
prices pk
i,i = 1,2;k = W,S,M, reported in Table 1, using the parameter
values α = 1/2 and β = 1.10
<Figure 1 around here>
We ﬁrst study the price changes associated with a change in market con-
ﬁguration from S to M. Figure 1 highlights that the eﬀects on the prices of
the private and the public ﬁrm crucially depend on the level of γ. Changing
9We will discuss these changes in investments below.
10Choosing other parameter values does not aﬀect the qualitative results of the analysis.
Since we focus on positive equilibrium prices and investments, we restrict attention to
γ ∈ [0,0.7].
15from S to M decreases (increases) both prices for low (high) values of γ. For
intermediate values of γ, the public ﬁrm’s price falls, whereas the private
ﬁrm’s price increases. Similarly, there is no clear-cut relation between pM
1
and pM
2 : We ﬁnd pM
2 < pM
1 for low values of γ and the reversed inequality
for high values of γ.
Next, consider the welfare-maximizing price in the mixed duopoly and
the welfare optimum, respectively. Figure 1 indicates that pM
2 ≤ pW
2 for
any admissible γ. That is, in the mixed duopoly, the public ﬁrm’s price is
consistently below the benchmark price in the welfare optimum. This result
follows from the need of the welfare-maximizing ﬁrm to distort its pricing
downwards to correct for the proﬁt-maximizing behavior of its competitor in
the mixed duopoly.
The following result summarizes these ﬁndings.
Result 2 (pricing) Suppose demand is linear and given by (13). Then,
(i) changing the market conﬁguration from S to M may increase or de-
crease the prices of both the private and the public ﬁrm, depending on
γ.
(ii) in the mixed duopoly, the public ﬁrm distorts the welfare-maximizing
price downwards to correct for the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing be-
havior.
Next, let us compare the ﬁrms’ investments across market conﬁgurations.
Figure 2 plots the closed-form solutions for the respective quality levels from
Table 1.
<Figure 2 around here>
Inspection of Figure 2 indicates that ﬁrms consistently underinvest in the
standard duopoly relative to the welfare optimum (θS
i < θW
i ,i = 1,2). In
the mixed duopoly, only the private ﬁrm consistently underinvests (θM
1 <
16θW
1 ), whereas the public ﬁrm overinvests (θM
2 ≥ θW
2 ) for low values of γ
and underinvests (θM
2 < θW
2 ) for high values of γ. That is, in addition to
distorting its pricing downwards, the public ﬁrm distorts its quality upwards
(downwards) for low (high) γ. It is also worth noting that the private ﬁrm’s
quality in the mixed duopoly (θM
1 ) tends to be higher than its quality in the
standard duopoly (θS
i ). The next result summarizes these ﬁndings.
Result 3 (investment) Suppose demand is linear and given by (13). Then,




(ii) in the mixed duopoly, the private ﬁrm strictly underinvests (θM
1 < θW
1 ),
whereas the public ﬁrm distorts investment upwards (downwards) for
low (high) γ to correct for the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing behavior.




conﬁgurations. Figure 3 plots the corresponding closed-form solutions from
Table 1.
<Figure 3 around here>
We ﬁrst focus on the price-quality ratio rW
i oﬀered in the welfare optimum.
Figure 3 illustrates that this ratio is linearly increasing in γ, that is, the price-
quality ratio gets worse for closer substitutes. This is in marked contrast
to the price-quality ratio rS
i in the standard duopoly, which is monotone
decreasing (i.e., “getting better”) in γ. Intuitively, the result follows from the
social planner’s internalization of the externalities between the two markets.
Next, consider the impact of a change from S to M on the ratios oﬀered
by the private and the public ﬁrm (as functions of γ): The locus of the pri-
vate ﬁrm’s price-quality ratio rM
1 is rotated downwards, whereas the locus
of the public ﬁrm’s price-quality ratio rM
2 is becoming strictly convex in γ.
17More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the change from S to M leads to an improve-
ment of the price-quality ratio oﬀered by the private ﬁrm for any admissible
γ. In addition, it distorts the price-quality ratio oﬀered by the public ﬁrm
downwards (upwards) for low (high) values of γ. That is, for low values of
γ, the mixed duopoly oﬀers price-quality ratios that are even better than in
the welfare optimum. The intuition is, again, that the welfare-maximizing
public ﬁrm must correct for the proﬁt-maximizing behavior of the private
ﬁrm in the mixed duopoly.
The next result summarizes these ﬁndings.
Result 4 (price-quality ratios) Suppose demand is linear and given by
(13). Then,
(i) changing the market conﬁguration from S to M induces the private ﬁrm
to oﬀer a better price-quality ratio (rM
1 ≤ rS
1) for any admissible γ.
(ii) in the mixed duopoly, the public ﬁrm oﬀers an even better price-quality
ratio than the welfare benchmark (rM
1 ≤ rW
1 ) for low γ to correct for
the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing behavior.
6 Conclusion
This paper has introduced demand-enhancing investment into a mixed-duopoly
model with reduced-form demand functions. Analyzing a model with prod-
uct diﬀerentiation and making no assumptions on the relative eﬃciency of
the public ﬁrm, we have derived the following key results. First, public in-
vestment crowds out private investment if it (i) reduces the equilibrium price
of the private ﬁrm, and (ii) undermines the demand-enhancing eﬀect of pri-
vate investment. These eﬀects reduce the private ﬁrm’s marginal returns to
investment and therefore dampen its investment incentive. Second, the eﬀect
of the public ﬁrm’s welfare (rather than proﬁt) maximization on equilibrium
investments and prices is generally ambiguous and depends on the details of
18the demand functions. In the linear demand case, for instance, the sign of
these eﬀects depends on the value of the substitutability parameter. Third,
with linear demand, the presence of a public ﬁrm eﬀectively disciplines the
private ﬁrm. The price-quality ratios oﬀered by the private and the public
ﬁrm are better than in the standard duopoly, and the public ﬁrm’s price-
quality ratio is even better than in the welfare optimum to discipline the
proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrm.
Our analysis indicates that, depending on demand conditions, the impact
of public investment on private investment and market performance may vary
considerably across markets. This is consistent with the ambivalent empirical
ﬁndings discussed in David et al. (2000). The model also suggests that public
investment is more likely to crowd out private investment if products are
close substitutes or public investment has a direct negative (business-stealing)
eﬀect on the demand of the private ﬁrm (as illustrated for the case with linear
demand). These insights provide guidance for the practical assessment of
whether public investment is likely to crowd out private investment in a
speciﬁc market.
Let us conclude by noting that, in a standard mixed-oligopoly setting, it
is not clear why the crowding out of private investment should be prevented.
In fact, the crowding out (if any) is a very consequence of the public ﬁrm’s
welfare-maximizing behavior. Crowding out is arguably less harmless if the
public ﬁrm does adhere to some political agenda rather than maximize social
welfare. We hope to address this issue in future research.
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Table 1: Linear Demand (c1 = c2 = 0)Figure 1: Prices in the three market conﬁgurations (α = 1/2, β = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0)Figure 2: Qualities in the three market conﬁgurations (α = 1/2, β = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0)Figure 3: Price-Quality ratios in the three market conﬁgurations (α = 1/2, β = 1 and c1 = c2 = 0)